Interview : W. Kip Viscusi by Aaron Steelman
INTERVIEW
RF: It seems that the public and its political representa-
tives often do not fully appreciate the trade-offs and, in
some cases, the unintended consequences associated
with measures aimed at improving consumer safety.
Could you give a few examples? And why do you think
such regulations are viewed so positively when econo-
mists tend to be less sanguine about their virtues?
Viscusi:Congress tends to pass legislation that is supposed to
rid the world of risk. “Let’s get rid of pollution.” “Let’s make
the workplace safe.” That certainly sounds great in speeches.
But very rarely do you see legislative mandates that permit a
balancing of their costs and benefits. The U.S. Department of
Transportation is arguably the main exception. 
This doesn’t mean the public doesn’t care about the costs.
In fact, when people are confronted with those costs directly,
they are often opposed. But with most regulations, the costs
are not explicit. There are no price tags attached to them.
Also, the costs are often borne by different parties. 
So, for instance, in the case of Superfund cleanups of haz-
ardous wastes, the people who benefit from the cleanups are
not paying the costs directly and thus demand the most
stringent standards possible. The result is that the median
cost per cancer case averted is about $7 billion. It’s off the
charts because you are using the responsible parties’ money
to clean up the site. In contrast, if you look at the amount of
money people are willing to pay for houses that are not
exposed to hazardous waste risks, you don’t observe that
kind of large trade-off at all. It’s more like $5 million rather
than $7 billion. Similarly, the premium that workers require
to work in relatively dangerous jobs is a lot less than what
government agencies spend on regulations. 
Another example of the kind of thing that legislators do
not fully consider is the effect of regulation on behavior. 
In the case of safety caps, which was one of the first risk
behavior case studies I examined, there were mandatory


























Every day, people expose themselves to risk. Whether
it’s driving to work, crossing the street, or climbing a
ladder to change a lightbulb, we engage in activities that
have a small probability of injuring or even killing us.
Some people — miners, construction workers, and fire-
fighters, for instance — take jobs that are considerably
more dangerous than the typical profession. Kip Viscusi
has spent much of his career examining how individuals
evaluate risk exposure and the public policies aimed at
improving worker and consumer safety. 
Viscusi has been a leader in the use of cost-benefit
analysis to evaluate a wide range of regulations, having
served as a consultant to the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration, and the Federal Aviation
Administration. He has also looked at unanticipated
behavioral changes prompted by government mandates,
which sometimes render those mandates ineffective or
even counterproductive. In addition, he has carefully
followed the multistate tobacco settlement, arguing
that the agreement has done much to enrich plaintiffs’
attorneys but little to discourage youth smoking, one
of its ostensible goals.
Trained as an economist, Viscusi has taught in both the
economics departments and the law schools of several
leading universities, including Northwestern, Duke,
Harvard, and now Vanderbilt, which has recently
launched a Ph.D. program in law and economics. Viscusi
has authored or co-authored more than 20 books, and
his papers have appeared in leading journals such as
the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, and the Journal of Legal Studies. He is 
also the founding editor of the Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty. Aaron Steelman interviewed Viscusi at 
his office at Vanderbilt on March 29, 2007.
RF SPRING 07_1-51_Rev7.9  7/12/07  3:06 PM  Page 40safety cap requirements on aspirin and other potentially
dangerous products that children might try to get into. So
what happened? Because parents thought the safety caps
made them risk-free — in fact, they were first called 
“childproof” caps by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission — people started leaving the bottles around in
the open rather than storing them,
giving kids greater access. In some
cases, people left the caps off 
altogether because they were so hard
to grapple with every time you wanted
to open the bottle.
As I said earlier, the main agency
that seems to care about trade-offs is
the Department of Transportation.
The costs of the mandates they issue
are quite evident in product price. If
you require more safety features on
cars, that will raise the price, and 
consumers will see that. But the link
is not as direct with environmental 
or worker safety regulations.
Economists see the costs and 
benefits from the economy-wide
standpoint but the consumer doesn’t
engage in that type of analysis, and I
think that’s why many regulations are
not subject to strict public scrutiny.
RF: How much discipline does the
market impose on companies to act
in a responsible way with respect to
worker safety?
Viscusi: There are three major sources of financial incen-
tives for job safety. By far the most important is the market.
Workers on dangerous jobs generally perceive that they are
dangerous. This drives up their wages and gives the company
an incentive to make the workplace safer. If you look at it
empirically, this dwarfs everything else that is going on. The
number two player is workers’ compensation. The premiums
for workers’ compensation are now in the $30 billion a year
range. Particularly if you are a large enterprise, your workers’
compensation bill goes up if you have a bad accident record.
We found that in the absence of workers’ compensation,
worker fatality rates would go up by one-third. So that’s a
very large effect. Then, third, we get to the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), which issues
health and safety regulation for the Department of Labor.
You are looking at zero effect in the early years of the agency,
and maybe something like a 1 percent to 2 percent total
effect on safety in recent years. It’s very small.
So, overall, the market exerts the most discipline on com-
panies to protect workers. Every death on the job generates
significant wage premiums in effect. But if a worker falls to
his death because the scaffolding is poorly constructed,
OSHA goes in there and imposes negligible fines compared
to this. It is just not a big player. Workers’ compensation is a
different case. In general, I think it is a very good program.
The question is who pays for workers’ compensation? Even
though companies pay the bill directly, that bill is passed down
to workers who receive lower wages.
What we found is that workers
are willing to accept a wage cut that
exceeds the costs of the premiums
because they value the insurance
more than the actuarial costs of the
insurance. It’s similar to people who
pay more than the expected payout
for auto insurance because they
value having that protection. Also,
workers’ compensation is a highly
efficient insurance program. It has
very low administrative costs, so it
pays out something like 80 cents on
the dollar, which is tremendous. In
addition, companies get value from
the program because it protects
them from being sued by their
employees in case of an accident.
They avoid a lot of litigation as 
a result, and I think that is a 
significant benefit.
RF: How does one properly derive
an estimate of the value of a statis-
tical life for use in cost-benefit
analysis? How can those estimates
be used to improve public policy?
Viscusi: The main technique used by economists is to look
at the money-risk trade-offs reflected in the decisions that
people actually make. One context is the labor market,
where workers are paid more for dangerous jobs. Another
context is the product market, where people pay less money
for a relatively unsafe product or more money for a relatively
safe product. I have looked at both contexts. But most of my
work has focused on the labor market because we have a lot
of data on workers’ wages, which we can match to the risks
of those jobs. 
Controlling for other aspects of the job, we find that
workers are in fact paid more if they work in hazardous jobs.
This is not a new theory. Adam Smith developed this in 1776.
But it was only in the 1970s that economists started estimat-
ing the relationship. My current estimate puts the value at
$7 million per statistical life. What that means is that if you
face an annual risk of death on the job of one chance in
10,000, on average you get paid about $700 extra per year.
During the Carter administration, I worked in the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group and was the Deputy
Director of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, which
was responsible for regulatory oversight at that time. 
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RF SPRING 07_1-51_Rev7.9  7/12/07  3:06 PM  Page 41I suggested to OSHAthat they use statistical estimates such
as these to value the benefits of OSHA regulations. They
said, “No. It would be immoral to put a dollar value on
human life. Absolutely not.” Then in 1982, OSHA proposed
a hazard communication regulation that for the first time
would have required the labeling of dangerous chemicals in
the workplace and sent it over to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for review. 
President Reagan had just set up this group within OMB
that looked at new regulations and required that the benefits
be greater than the costs. OMB looked at this and said this
is all very interesting but the costs are greater than the 
benefits. Because OSHA had argued that putting a dollar
value on life was immoral, they instead said that when calcu-
lating the benefits of improved safety due to the regulation,
they were only going to estimate the cost of death. The cost
of death was the present value of lost earnings plus your
medical costs after you are killed on the job. Well, you can
call it the cost of death or you can call it the value of life, but
it’s still the same thing. OSHA appealed the decision to the
vice president, who was in charge of all such appeals. He said
it was a technical issue and needed to be settled by an expert. 
I was asked to settle the dispute between the two agencies
over the regulatory impact analysis. It was pretty easy. What
I did was adopt every one of OMB’s assumptions with the
analysis except for one thing: I used my value of life number
instead of the cost of death number. Doing that increased
the benefits by a factor of 10. Once you used the economic
value of life numbers, the regulation had benefits greater
than the costs, and the regulation was issued. So after that,
regulatory agencies started using the numbers. Part of the
reason was that it was good economics. But a big part was
that it often made their benefits look large, and that’s what
carried the day. 
A related issue I have been working on recently is
whether old people’s lives are worth less than young people’s
lives. I was at a conference and suggested that the answer
was yes, because of shorter life expectancy and lower quality
of life. This generated a lot of discussion. Since that time, I
have looked more closely at how the value of a statistical life
varies with age. It turns out that it doesn’t really drop off the
table as you get older. In fact, workers at age 60 have a higher
value per statistical life than workers at age 20 because they
are richer and can do more things that they enjoy. To take
one example, I buy cars with all these additional safety fea-
tures while my son drives around in a topless Jeep Wrangler.
Why would this make sense if his value per statistical life
was higher than mine?
RF: What is your opinion of the compensation policy
toward the families of the victims of the terrorist attacks
of Sept. 11? That policy generated much criticism, but
did it conform to sound economic reasoning?
Viscusi: First of all, you would not want to use the value per
statistical life to compensate people because these are the
values from the standpoint of prevention — for instance,
how much we should pay to prevent the small probability of
death. Instead, we’re trying to figure out what is the optimal
insurance of the losses of the families. So this situation is
much more analogous to a wrongful death case in the courts.
If you are killed by a drunk driver, what should the compen-
sation be? Generally, it’s the present value of lost earnings
minus some deduction for consumption of the deceased. I
think you would want to do the same thing with the victims
of Sept. 11. What they didn’t do, which the courts would do,
was to continue the compensation up the income ladder.
Instead, they capped the compensation at a particular
amount. If you really wanted to provide income replacement
and handle it the way the courts do, there would be no cap 
at the top. So in some ways, what they did was institute a
program more similar to workers’ compensation, which also
has caps.
As to whether the families of the victims should have been
compensated at all, that is a society-wide decision. But it’s
important to consider that the people who were killed on
Sept. 11 were not engaged in any moral hazard. They did
nothing to put themselves at any known risk. So compensation
does not create any incentive effect that would cause concern.
RF: Setting aside the issue of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, how would you assess the public policy
response to the threat of domestic terrorism post-
Sept. 11? Are we thinking about the issues in a way that
is roughly correct and weighing the costs and 
benefits in a generally rational way?
Viscusi: One problem is that economists think about these
things a lot differently than other people. We are always
thinking about trade-offs and balancing competing concerns.
In the case of responding to terrorism risks, you have two
classes of concerns that tend to be considered sacred by some
people: civil liberties on one hand and people’s safety on the
other. You have people in each camp who say they are willing
to do nothing to compromise those values. Neither one
wants to admit that these things do have a finite value and
that you might have to strike some sort of trade-off. The real
issue is what type of trade-off you want to strike, or how
much you are willing to give up to increase safety.
The reason this is tricky is we don’t have very good numbers
on what these risks are. We just don’t have a lot of data —
unlike, say the risk of being in an automobile accident. We
know the probability of that with relative precision. But the
estimates of the probability of a terrorist attack or the num-
ber of people who are going to die in the coming year are all
over the map. So if you can’t assess the likelihood of a ter-
rorist attack or how deadly it is going to be, it is really hard
to say how much you should spend to try to prevent it.
RF: What do you think of the proposal to establish a 
prediction market to help assess the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack?
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affect the probability of that outcome. If you can bet on it
and make a lot of money, then people may have an incentive
to launch a terrorist attack so they can collect on their bet.
Also, I’m not sure the information you would get would be
refined enough to help you devise a defense strategy. It
wouldn’t help you much to know that the probability of an
attack has gone up if you don’t know the target. So the mar-
kets would need to be very specific, such as the probability
of the Holland Tunnel being blown up in the next month.
RF: What do we know about the
economic and legal effects of the
1998 settlement between state
governments and tobacco com-
panies? And how, if at all, should
that settlement be modified?
Viscusi: I don’t think there is
much I can say that is good about
it. From the standpoint of the
industry, the idea was that if they
made this settlement, they would be putting all the tobacco
litigation behind them. Instead, what they did was hand out
billions of dollars to plaintiffs’ attorneys who have used that
money to finance future litigation. So there has been a wave
of lawsuits after the settlement. I would have rather seen
them play out the court cases. If they lost and were 
responsible for all the health-care costs generated by 
smokers, then they would have paid up. But that was never
really decided. 
So this was a fairly novel legal concept: If people use a
dangerous product that leads to health-care costs in the
Medicaid program, you can recoup the costs. That’s not
true of every product. People are injured in car accidents,
for instance, which generate health-care costs also. The
trigger here to warrant making the cigarette industry pay
the bills is that consumers have to be deceived or victims of
fraudulent behavior. If there is no wrongful conduct on the
part of the companies, you can’t nail them. But, of course,
people have known for a very long time that cigarettes 
were dangerous.
In 1964, the Department of Education, Health, and
Welfare issued a report stating that smoking caused lung
cancer. Two years later, mandatory warnings were placed on
packs of cigarettes indicating that they were dangerous. This
is the first mass-marketed consumer product that did not
kill you immediately when used as intended which had 
on-product warnings. Alot of things you take for granted as
having warnings, like power tools and household cleaners, did
not have warnings back then. What did have warnings were
really dangerous chemicals like sulfuric acid and hydrochloric
acid, prescription drugs, pesticides and insecticides, and
that’s just about it. So it’s not a state secret that cigarettes are
dangerous. In fact, when asked, people vastly overstate the
likelihood that a typical smoker will get lung cancer. 
None of the cases went to trial. The settlement appeared
to be a good idea to executives because whenever there was
a rumor of a settlement, stock prices would go up. What
they did not anticipate was that they would be funding a lot
of other lawsuits against them.
From the standpoint of society, the main selling point
was, “We need this for the kids. We are going to take the
money and use it to combat youth smoking.” The settlement
led to what is in effect a 40-cent tax on each pack 
of cigarettes. The money has flowed to the states, but 
only a negligible amount has 
been used for programs aimed 
at preventing youth smoking. 
So that’s the reality of what has
happened, and I think the anti-
smoking groups would agree 
with that.
Also, part of the settlement
restricted the advertising of ciga-
rettes and some have argued that
has led to anticompetitive effects.
The reason is that if you can’t
advertise your product, it’s hard to introduce new brands,
and that serves to lock in the existing market shares in an
industry that is already highly concentrated. One of the
plaintiffs’ experts, Joseph Stiglitz, has attacked the agree-
ment, arguing that it is part of a great conspiracy to limit
competition. So even those on the antismoking side 
concede that there are some problems with the way they
structured the agreement. On the one hand, they want to
limit advertising. On the other hand, they don’t want to
restrict competition. But you can’t do both.
RF: What does your work on jury analysis tell us about
jurors’ risk beliefs? And how do those views compare to
judges’ views? Also, what can be done to reform the
compensation process to better align what juries award
in punitive damages with what would be consistent with
mainstream risk analysis?
Viscusi: Jurors are subject to a variety of behavioral anom-
alies in terms of how they perceive risk. One of the most
important is hindsight bias. That’s important for accident
cases where jurors will say, “Well, they should have known
that doing this would have caused the accident.” They fail to
perceive that at the time you take the action, there is a prob-
ability that something bad will happen, but it’s not definite
the person will get injured. This comes up in a variety of 
contexts. For instance, car companies do corporate risk
analysis. They analyze the risks associated with a car and the
costs associated with improving the safety, and if the costs
are greater than the benefits, they don’t do it. If you do that
analysis and decide not to take the extra safety precautions,
juries generally find you to be reckless because you have
thought about the risk and decided the preventive measures
weren’t worth making. 
You can’t just 
wave a magic wand and 
eliminate risk for free.
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ments and asked what they would
decide if the companies acted the way
economists would suggest, using the
value per statistical life employed by
the Department of Transportation.
The results actually got worse. Before,
they were awarding punitive damages
of about $1 million. But when 
they found out that the company was
valuing a statistical life at $4 million,
they awarded punitive damages of $10
million. So the more responsible the
companies get in how they value life,
the worse they fare, because juries
want to send a message and top the
dollar value that the companies are
using in their analysis. Juries tend to
resist the whole idea of looking at
what the costs are and what the bene-
fits are and then making a rational
decision based on the numbers. 
I have also run surveys on judges,
and judges do much better than juries in terms of how accu-
rate their risk beliefs are with respect to the major causes of
death. Jurors tend to overestimate small risks much more
than judges do — even though judges overestimate as well.
Judges are more cognizant of benefits and costs, and less
subject to hindsight bias because they have seen lots of cases
and know that not everything is preventable.
I think one reform we should have is turning over the 
setting of punitive damages to judges. Jurors do a much better
job of evaluating whether conduct is bad than assigning a
dollar value to the bad conduct. I don’t particularly fault
jurors for that. When you look at jury instructions, there is
no guidance about how you should come up with a punitive
damages number. The result of this is that the plaintiffs’
attorneys will try to give them an anchor, which is often
totally irrelevant, such as what the company spent on 
advertising last year. They are just trying to get a big number
out there for jurors to latch onto because there is no
methodology for coming up with a dollar value. As a result,
you often get ridiculously large awards, which later are
reduced by the courts. 
RF: How have people’s preferences for the consumption
of environmental health and beauty changed over time?
Viscusi:There is no question that our valuation of the envi-
ronment has gone up, and I think much of that has to do
with increased wealth. We can afford to enact stricter envi-
ronmental standards now. When you look around the world,
the poorer countries do not have as stringent environmental
standards. If you really want to get a sense of what pollution
is, you have to leave the United States. 
I think the effect of wealth on preferences is interesting
from the standpoint that a lot of pro-
posals have been made saying we should
not import goods from countries where
the job safety standards are not as
strong as ours or the environmental
standards don’t meet our criteria. The
net effect of these proposals would be
to keep those countries poor. So these
protectionist measures would not do us
any favors — and they certainly wouldn’t
do them any favors. Also, we should
remember that the United States did
not have such a pristine environment
100 years ago, when we had much lower
per-capita income. In fact, most of the
major environmental regulatory agen-
cies — the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, for instance — were not
created until the 1970s.
RF: How has economic analysis
affected the way lawyers, judges, 
and regulators have looked at policy issues over the 
past 35 years? Do they take economic analysis more 
seriously now?
Viscusi: Yes, they are heading in the right direction, but
they still have a long way to go. In 1985, I testified before
Congress on Superfund. I was talking about costs and benefits
and one of the representative’s questions was: “Costs and
benefits? Isn’t it just common sense that you want benefits
greater than costs?” I was taken aback. I had never heard a
congressman say something so sensible. So I think some of
the basic ideas have been adopted. 
Also, if you look at the curricula of law schools, you can’t
get through those three years without knowing something
about the Coase theorem. In fact, I would say that there are
law-and-economics scholars on the faculty of virtually every
major law school in the United States today. So some core
ideas in law and economics are now routinely taught. In
addition, there are some justices on the Supreme Court,
such as Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer, who know a lot of
economics. And, increasingly, law clerks are coming to their
jobs equipped with the basic tools of economic analysis,
which judges rely on when doing research for their opinions.
So times have changed. I think there is no doubt that the
law-and-economics movement has been the most important
intellectual development to hit law schools in the last 
half century.
RF: How, if at all, does recent work by “behavioral econ-
omists” — which claims to show that consumers are
often irrational and make systematic errors — compli-
cate risk analysis, which generally assumes that people
are rational given certain constraints?
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myself. But the fact that you observe systematic errors does
not mean that markets necessarily don’t work, because not
everyone has to understand what is going on for the market
to function pretty well. Also, the fact that you find an error
doesn’t mean it’s a big deal. You can construct a lot of these
experiments that have nothing to do with the real world and
find an anomaly, but that doesn’t mean actual decisions will
be off. In addition, the fact that there is an error doesn’t
mean it’s a market failure and the government needs to do
more. Sometimes, it means the government needs to do less.
One error is that people tend to overestimate small risks. 
If that’s true, they won’t be taking enough small 
risks. So it doesn’t mean you want to regulate some things 
more stringently. In fact, you may want to regulate them 
less stringently.
One anomaly that I find interesting is that people are
really adverse to ambiguous losses. This has an effect on 
government policies. Instead of looking at the mean risk
associated with something, they look at the worst-case 
scenario. So if it’s an imprecisely understood risk, they focus
on how bad it possibly could be, rather than how bad it prob-
ably will be. This is true throughout the federal government,
where the upper bound is used as the risk number. This really
distorts all the risk numbers coming out of the government.
An example is the Superfund cleanup efforts. What’s the
concentration of the chemical at the site? They take the
upper bound for that. What’s the exposure level at the site?
They take the upper bound for that. What’s the frequency of
exposure? They take the upper bound for that. So they mul-
tiply four or five upper-bound numbers, which vastly
exaggerates the estimate by the time you are done.
RF: In your view, is there a role for normative analysis
when working on issues involving risk? For instance,
should we place some value — even if, ultimately, it 
is merely symbolic — on the notion that people have 
an obligation to behave safely and that legislators 
and regulators have a duty to try to make them act in
that manner? 
Viscusi: I have some limited sympathy for that type of argu-
ment. We do care about individual health. That’s why we
spend a lot of money on various government health-care
programs. We don’t want our fellow citizens to be ill. So
that’s a legitimate concern. On the other hand, let’s say I
decide that I don’t think anyone should endanger his life by
working in a steel mill. In that case, you are imposing your
own preferences on someone else and in the process lowering
his perceived welfare. That’s a type of paternalism that I
think is really hard to justify. 
When it comes to these types of things, most people 
really don’t understand economics. I was at a conference that
was attended by one of the leading health policy experts in
Europe — he’s even knighted — and he said that we should
give health care to everyone. My response was: Would you
require cars to be as safe as they possibly could be? And he
said yes. But that would mean that even the cheapest cars
would cost a lot of money and many people would not be
able to buy them. You can’t just wave a magic wand and 
eliminate risk for free, which is what people want to do. If
you restrict people from taking jobs, if you restrict the foods
that they eat, if you place limits on how much they 
can weigh, all of these things will reduce their welfare as 
they perceive it. The proper role of government is to give
people enough information so they can make reasonable
decisions, and after that step aside and allow them to make
their own choices.
RF: There are some law schools where economic 
analysis is an important part of the curricula and many
economics departments where one can work on similar
issues. What is the market that you wish to satisfy with
the new Ph.D. program in law and economics 
at Vanderbilt?
Viscusi: Even though most law schools teach law and 
economics, as we discussed earlier, they don’t teach it at the
graduate level. Ours is a much more high-powered 
program than anything I have seen. Students have to take
micro theory and the standard econometric sequence and
then we bolster it with additional behavioral techniques 
and more empirical methods. So our students are going to 
be better geared up, technically, than the typical J.D./Ph.D.
student, who takes the J.D. courses in the law school and
then is sent over to the economics department to complete
those courses. So the two programs are not really integrated
in a meaningful way, and we attempt to bridge that gap with
the program at Vanderbilt. Our first entering class will arrive
this fall, and within six years they will leave with both a J.D.
and a Ph.D. We want our students to be skilled enough to get
jobs in economics departments, but the program is really
designed to place graduates in teaching positions at law
schools where they can apply the integrated skill set that
they have acquired.
RF: Which economists have influenced you the most?
Viscusi: The people I am going to mention are the three
members of my dissertation committee. And I picked them
for a reason, so it wasn’t just by accident that they had a big
influence. The chairman of the committee was Kenneth
Arrow. Even though I am not the same type of theorist that
he is, he sets a very high standard and is an inspiration. Also,
he did a lot of work on risk and uncertainty that I thought
was clever and innovative at the time. Another member was
Richard Zeckhauser, who was also my undergraduate thesis
adviser. I have worked with him over basically my whole
career and we continue to co-author papers. The third 
member was Richard Freeman, a labor economist, who 
continues to do inventive things with data and is always
moving on to new and interesting topics. RF
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